William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 4

Article 14

2004

A History of the Corporate Entity's Accession to
Power
Michael R. Kuhn

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Kuhn, Michael R. (2004) "A History of the Corporate Entity's Accession to Power," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 30: Iss. 4, Article
14.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/14

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been
accepted for inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information,
please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Kuhn: A History of the Corporate Entity's Accession to Power
KUHN-READY.DOC

5/20/2004 9:42 PM

A HISTORY OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY’S
ACCESSION TO POWER
Michael R. Kuhn†
The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea.
By John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge.
Modern Library, 2003. 191 pages. $19.95.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enron. WorldCom. Tyco. It has not been unusual in the
years following the collapse of the energy-trading firm, Enron, to
pick up one’s morning paper to discover a corporate officer being
led away from an office building in handcuffs or charged with the
white-collar crimes of embezzlement, fraud, or obstruction of
1
justice. While “perp walks” such as these serve to mollify a jittery
investor class, as a structural force and a decision-making entity,
two writers from the magazine The Economist, John Micklethwait
and Adrian Wooldridge, believe such arrests might also signal a
transformation in how our society views the corporation. In
Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s book, The Company: A Short History
of a Revolutionary Idea, the two condense 5000 years of the
development of what they call “joint stock companies” into a
concise, readable history of one of our society’s foremost powers.
The authors conclude that, despite abuses of the corporate form
† J.D., 2002, cum laude, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., cum laude,
Saint John’s University. Michael specializes in corporate mergers and acquisitions
at Lindquist & Vennum, PLLP in Minneapolis.
1. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays & Leslie Eaton, The Martha Stewart Verdict: The
Overview, Stewart Found Guilty of Lying in Sale of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2004, at
A1 (reporting that Martha Stewart was found guilty of conspiracy, obstruction of
justice and giving false statements to authorities in connection with her sale of
ImClone stock); Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Skilling Is Indicted by U.S. in Fraud Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A1 (recounting how former Enron Corp. CEO Jeffrey
Skilling was taken to court in handcuffs and charged with three dozen counts of
fraud, insider trading, and other crimes in an indictment stemming from Enron’s
collapse).
1571
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such as those seen in the Enron or WorldCom scandals, the joint
stock company is still the most important and powerful
organization in the world.
II. OVERVIEW
The Company explores the relatively rapid development of the
modern corporation and, in turn, examines that entity’s
emergence as the dominant form of economic organization.
Micklethwait and Wooldridge begin their analysis of that question
in Mesopotamia in 3000 B.C. and quickly cover 4500 years of
economic development, from the family merchants who traded
along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to the societates of Rome, to
2
the current technology companies found in Silicon Valley. The
two observe common themes in many of these business
organizations, such as the quest for limited liability and the pooling
of investor resources to limit risk allocations.
Interestingly, one of the themes that Micklethwait and
Wooldridge mine as an apt comparison to today’s modern
corporation is the level of governmental involvement or, at times,
3
acquiescence in a particular entity’s operations. In the Middle
Ages, guilds were the dominant form of business organization.
4
These entities resembled modern trade unions by operating
5
umbrella groups for members of particular crafts.
As guilds
became increasingly powerful organizations, the crown became
concerned because “they circumvented feudal fees by never dying,
6
never coming of age, and never getting married.” The sovereign,
however, would not be denied its revenue. Typically, the crown
granted guilds a monopoly to operate within the confines of a city’s
7
walls in exchange for substantial monetary “donations.” Another
source of royal revenue was to call in the guilds’ charters for
2. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT AND ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter “MICKLETHWAIT &
WOOLDRIDGE”].
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 13.
5. See, e.g., TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA 19 (2003). Nace discusses guilds
such as the Skinners, the Fishmongers, the Goldsmiths, the Grocers, the Drapers,
the Mercers, the Tailors, the Saddlers, the Haberdashers, the Cordwainers, the
Merchant Tailors, the Salters, the Ironmongers, the Vintonners, and the
Clothmakers. Id. at 19-20.
6. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 13.
7. Id.
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renewal as a method to collect additional fees. Thus, although
nervous about the power certain guilds wielded, the sovereign
became crucial to their development by offering security and the
9
promise of a guaranteed market.
Micklethwait and Wooldridge also explore the interaction of
government and business in the chartering of voyages in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Companies chartered by
10
individual countries popularized the modern concepts of limited
liability and the pooling of capital. Due to the high level of risk
involved in backing such expeditions to the far corners of the
modern globe, financiers of such voyages sought to spread their
11
capital among a number of voyages and fleets.
With pooled
capital, investors were for the first time detached from the actual
12
This emerging idea
individuals constituting the corporation.
would come to transform the idea of a corporation as a legal entity
existing apart from its owners.
With rampant financial speculation in early joint-stock
companies, inevitable market corrections and “bubbles” developed
similar to ones that can also be seen in today’s markets. In one
investment debacle, Micklethwait and Wooldridge recount how
John Law (1671-1729) intended to rescue France from its inflation
13
problems and unstable currency. Law allowed investors to buy
shares in the Mississippi Company in installments, providing loans
14
from the Banque Royale and using the shares as security. Few
investors questioned what Law’s company actually did because Law
15
controlled both the central bank and the stock market. In 1720,
8. NACE, supra note 5, at 21.
9. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 14. The authors liken such
a guaranteed market to present-day defense contractors that obtain similar
security measures and guarantees of a fixed market from the United States
Department of Defense. Id.
10. Columbus, Magellan, and Vasco da Gama were all “recipients of royal
charters that gave them exclusive rights to trade with this or that bit of the world.”
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 17.
11. Id. at 20. The authors compare the risks of investing in spice missions to
Indonesia to those that would invest in space exploration today. Id. at 19.
12. The London-based Virginia Company, which helped found the
Jamestown Colony in what would become the United States, counted among its
“Adventurers” (investors who purchased a twelve-pound share) “wealthy aristocrats
and merchants but also such notables as William Shakespeare.” NACE, supra note
5, at 31.
13. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 28-31.
14. Id. at 30.
15. Id.
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Law’s bubble burst when a number of investors abandoned the
16
Mississippi Company. He was forced to flee the country, “leaving
17
France in chaos.”
The chapters detailing the period between 1850 and 1900,
however, are where Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s narrative
excels. It is at this point that the United States used state-charted
corporations with special monopoly rights to build some of the vital
infrastructure of the new country and to separate itself from what
would be a more traditional, stakeholder view of the corporation
evident in Europe.
Micklethwait and Wooldridge contend that three events
converged to prompt the “revolutionary” change in the
18
corporation in the United States. The first, and most important,
19
Railroads were not just the first
innovation was the railroad.
modern businesses; they also enabled the development of other
companies, “helped build . . . the infrastructure of a modern
economy,” “provided the right-of-way for telegraph and telephone
lines” and “revolutionized the Post Office,” and made it possible to
20
move goods throughout the country quickly and predictably. One
early beneficiary of the railroad revolution was Sears, Roebuck &
Co., which used the rails to ship mail-order products to remote
21
locales across the country.
The second change that affected the company’s role in the
United States was legal. Beginning in 1819, the Supreme Court
held in a ruling regarding the status of Dartmouth College that
states could not rewrite corporate charters capriciously because the
22
corporation possessed certain private rights.
Subsequently,
numerous constitutional rights previously accorded only to private
23
citizens were extended to corporations as well.
16. Id. at 30-31
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 45.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 62-63.
21. Id. at 57-58.
22. Id. at 45. Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518
(1819), is also important because it was the first case in which the Supreme Court
indicated that the Constitution, which makes no mention of corporations, could
be interpreted liberally enough to give corporations some constitutional
protections. Justice Marshall also made clear, however, that corporations remain
subject to state power, writing that the corporation is an “artificial being, invisible,
intangible and existing only in contemplation of law.”
23. The following constitutional rights were extended to corporations:
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24

The final prompt was political in nature. State restrictions on
incorporation in the early nineteenth century bore little
resemblance to today’s general incorporation laws. But beginning
in 1830, states began considering the impact that pro-business
statutes could have on a state’s ability to attract corporations to
relocate within their borders. In 1830, Massachusetts decided that
companies didn’t have to be engaged in public works to be
25
awarded a state charter.
In 1837, Connecticut allowed
incorporation of most businesses without a special legislative
26
enactment.
Finally, in a decision heavily lobbied for by the
Pennsylvania Railroad, the State of New Jersey loosened its
incorporation rules so that any corporation chartered in the state
27
could hold stock in any other corporation in the country. This
1899 revision of New Jersey law soon made it the preferred state in
which to incorporate. By 1901, seventy-one percent of all United
States corporations with assets of $25 million or greater were
founded in New Jersey, i.e., the legal recognition of the holding
County of Santa Clara v. S. Pac., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (the right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (the right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Noble v. Union River Logging R.R.. Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (the
right to Fifth Amendment protections); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (the
right to freedom from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment);
Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908) (the right to a jury trial
in a criminal case under the Sixth Amendment); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) (the right to compensation for governmental takings under the
Fifth Amendment); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (the right to
freedom from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531 (1970) (the right to a jury trial in a civil case under the Seventh
Amendment); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (the right to engage in commercial speech under the First Amendment);
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (the right to engage in
political speech under the First Amendment); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (the right to abstain from association with the speech
of others under the First Amendment).
24. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 45.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id.
27. NACE, supra note 5, at 67. Nace details the importance of this
development by showing that the amendment made it legal for companies to
operate outside of the boundaries of a particular state that had licensed it to do
business. By using the idea of a holding company, an entity formed specifically to
own stock in other companies, corporations were able to avoid state protectionist
statutes that limited the companies that could do business within their
jurisdictions. NACE, supra note 5, at 62. A holding company is a “company formed
to control other companies, usually confining its role to owning stock and
supervising management.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (7th ed. 1999).
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28

company. Soon after, other states fought back beginning a “race
29
to the bottom,” eventually won by Delaware. By the time of the
Great Depression, Delaware was home to one-third of the industrial
30
corporations trading on the New York Stock Exchange and it
continues to be home to the world’s most powerful businesses.
Micklethwait and Wooldridge conclude that these factors—the
development of railroads, the rise of “corporate” legal rights, and
increasingly lenient incorporation statutes—combined with the
American ambivalence to big business to create a ripe environment
in which conglomerates such as Ford Motor Co., General Electric
Co., American Tobacco, Coca-Cola, and others flourished. By
European standards, America was much less likely to regulate big
businesses because
[m]ost Americans were ambivalent about business. They
dislike concentrations of corporate power—the United
States, after all, is based on the division of power—but
they admired the sheer might of business. They disliked
the wealth of businessmen, but they admired the fact that
31
so many of them came from nothing . . . .
Americans looked at the rise in corporate power as a costbenefit equation in which the comforts that business had made
possible outweighed the sometimes corrupt practices used to
32
By improving standards of living for all
deliver such luxuries.
citizens and helping to establish social services such as museums,
parks, and art galleries in a country that was in need of such
philanthropy, the authors argue that it “bound the classes together”
33
even as “the income gap was widening.”
The authors also interestingly contrast the successes of the
American system of corporate organization against those that
involved Britain, Japan, and Germany. The conclusion drawn is
that Britain suffered partially from a society-wide “snobbish
distaste” for business and entrepreneurs that had the result of
starving British businesses of educated recruits and up-to-date
28. NACE supra note 5, at 68.
29. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 68-69. Virginia was called
a “snug harbour for roaming and piratical corporations,” the New York legislature
enacted a special charter to prevent General Electric Co. from moving to New
Jersey, and Delaware substantially liberalized its corporation laws. Id.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 77.
33. Id.
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34

expertise. Japan, meanwhile, clung to family-organized zaibatsu
35
(literally, “financial cliques”) until the Second World War. But
the Japanese government’s “habit of steering the economy in
pursuit of national greatness reached an ugly zenith in the Second
36
World War.”
Soon after the war ended, the Japanese began
transitioning away from the inflexible zaibatsu and closer to the
American model. Finally, Germany was able to recruit more highly
skilled workers than Britain due to the country’s emphasis on a
37
scientific and vocational education, but it also suffered from the
government’s insistence that businesses serve the country’s interests
as a whole. While appealing in an ideal society, Micklethwait and
Wooldridge assert that in both Germany and Japan, the focus on
the state’s goals rather than the company and its shareholders’
interests led to tragic results when nationalists forced businesses to
38
provide resources to the war machine.
In the last half of the twentieth century, Micklethwait and
Wooldridge contend both that the company experienced its
highest level of power but that it is now undergoing an
“unbundling” of its influence. First, the American “multidivisional”
firm, in which companies were divided into multiple divisions
subject only to a central authority, was implemented in many
companies.
This segmentation created flexibility in large
companies and propelled entities that adopted such an
39
organization to the forefront of their respective industries.
Competing businesses fell behind as the increased efficiency and
growth of firms that marshaled their combined divisions together
34. Id. at 84.
35. Id. at 97. The zaibatsu operated as a type of holding company that
managed a number of other firms through co-ownership and overlapping
directorates. Id. Typically, the zaibatsu would recruit non-family managers directly
from universities who would work for the extended family of companies the rest of
their lives. Id.
36. Id. at 98.
37. Id. at 94.
38. Id. at 91, 98-99.
39. Id. at 104-107. The authors explain that Alfred Sloan (1875-1966) first
implemented the multidivisional firm at General Motors. Id. at 105. Sloan
decided that each of GM’s divisions was too distinct to be run by a central
authority, so he created separate units—car, truck, parts, and accessories—to
operate as autonomous divisions. Id. at 105-06. By combining the divisions
together for purposes of buying power, GM was able to obtain economies of scale
in all the products it purchased. Id. at 106. General Electric, United States
Rubber, Standard Oil and U.S. Steel, among others, eventually adopted the
multidivisional structure. Id. at 107.
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for joint-buying clout secured cheaper prices from “everything
40
from steel to stationery.”
Although the development of the multidivisional company
produced increased efficiencies, the authors maintain that the last
twenty-five years has seen an unbundling of the company as
corporations have been forced to focus on their core
competencies. The change has resulted in smaller, more flexible
companies exploding out of Silicon Valley and quickly ascending
the Fortune 500 list. Indeed, the dot-com emphasis on informal
relationships and entrepreneurial activity rather than staid,
traditional companies has made “it ever easier for small
companies—or just collections of entrepreneurs—to challenge the
dominance of big companies; and ever more tempting for
entrepreneurs to enter into loose relationships with other
41
entrepreneurs rather than to form long-lasting corporations.”
Essentially, the goal today is not to form a company that could grow
to become an empire on the scale of Coca-Cola or Ford. Rather,
the emphasis among business and technology school graduates is
on entrepreneurialism—forming a smaller start-up company with
one great idea.
III. CRITIQUE
The Company is a successful book inasmuch as it achieves what
it sets out to do—provide a “short” historical view of the entity
known as the joint stock company.
But Micklethwait and
Wooldridge clearly paint a rosy history of the company:
The central good of the joint-stock company is that it is
the key to productivity growth in the private sector: the
best and easiest structure for individuals to pool capital, to
refine skills, and to pass them on. We are all richer as a
42
result.
Little in the way of labor rights, political machinations, legal
excess, or whom the company should ultimately serve—the
shareholders that constitute it or society that grants it a license to
40. Id. at 106-07. Ford Motors was one such company that resisted the
change to market segmentation and paid for it. By 1929, Ford’s market share fell
to 31 percent while GM’s had risen from 17 to 32.2 percent. Id. at 107 (citing
ALFRED CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 53
(1990)).
41. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 185.
42. Id. at 190.
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43

conduct business — is addressed. Indeed, although the authors
touch on the criticism that current multinational conglomerates
wield increasingly more power in a variety of social and economic
ways, they conclude that such arguments are overblown. After all,
companies still must obtain “a franchise from society, and the terms
44
of that franchise still matter enormously.” It is this selfishness,
Micklethwait and Wooldridge assert, that ironically keeps
businesses from acting solely for themselves. Because companies
are consistently establishing a relationship of trust with the societies
in which they do business, and they continue to seek to obtain the
top talent in their field from those societies, companies have “a
45
vested interest in being seen to do good.”
But the authors neglect to address that even if the marketplace
punishes unsuccessful and corrupt companies, these companies
often take down shareholders with them. Thus, while the legal
entities known as Enron and WorldCom appropriately paid the
price for pursuing illegitimate business practices, the sums of their
parts are left holding the bag.
In addition, while our society today is thought to be in a
second Gilded Age, The Company only tangentially mentions the
increasingly disparate compensation gap between executives and
46
employees, the internationalization of “blue” and “white” collar
47
jobs, or whether the spate of billion-dollar mergers will again
43. For an examination of the corporate system as it relates to focusing on
profits for stockholders to the exclusion of all else, see MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE
RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY (2001). Kelly
contends that the primary focus in modern corporations to maximize shareholder
returns is flawed. She argues that a new model for the corporation that examines
both external and internal constituents is needed in order for companies to reflect
American democratic political ideals.
44. Id. at 186.
45. Id. at 189. Micklethwait and Wooldridge conclude that the robber barons
built much of America’s educational and health infrastructure: Merck has donated
millions in AIDS education, Avon is one of the world’s largest breast cancer
investors, and IBM is a “strategic investor in education.” Id. at 188-89.
46. See, e.g., John A. Byrne, How to fix Corporate Governance, BUSINESS WEEK,
May 6, 2002, at 68 (stating that in 1980, the average CEO of a large corporation
earned forty-two times the average hourly worker’s pay; by 2001, the ratio had
increased to 411 times).
47. See, e.g., Stephen Baker & Manjeet Kripalani, Will Outsourcing Hurt
America’s Supremacy?, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 1, 2004, at 84 (estimating that in the
past three years, outsourced programming jobs have risen from 27,000 to an
estimated 80,000 and that by the end of 2004, one out of every ten jobs in U.S.
tech companies will move to emerging markets); The Great Hollowing-Out Myth, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2004, at 28 (citing a report by Forrester Research estimating
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48

reshape the company as we know it.
Asking a relatively brief historical book to do all these things
and more, however, admittedly is a bit unfair. Reading The
Company, while enlightening, is much like enrolling in an
introductory-level survey class of American history. While there are
extraordinarily interesting events to discuss, the depth of coverage
must necessarily be thin or incomplete in order to appropriately
address the time span being examined. Thus, while those
interested in a brief overview of the development of the corporate
form will not be disappointed, others may be left asking for more.
Crafting a history that is, in this reviewer’s mind, too short, is in
itself potentially a good thing. After all, there are numerous other
resources one can consult to delve more deeply into any neglected
areas. By authoring a concise and eminently fascinating review of
the turbulent past of this business organization, Micklethwait and
Wooldridge have begun the discussion regarding the terms upon
which society should do business with the companies that prove so
vital to each of our lives.

that 3.3 million American service-industry jobs will have gone overseas by 2015).
48. Micklethwait and Wooldridge do comment on the increased regulatory
oversight of companies in the post-Enron business environment. In their opinion,
because the vast majority of Americans are now currently holders of some business
securities in one form or another, such regulations will unlikely severely cripple
companies’ performance but seek mainly to provide improved oversight.
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 156.
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